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Comment
Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance
the Interests of the Indigent Accused
and Public Defenders
Jeffrey H. Rutherford
The Minnesota State Public Defender Program is fast approaching a
crisis. Immediate relief is necessary in each district of the state.1
Twenty-five years after Gideon, adequate legal representation for poor
defendants has not been obtained.... For many of the nation's poor,
therefore, the stark reality is that the legal system functions "as if
Gideon had never been decided."2
On June 2, 1987, a Minnesota district court sentenced Rich-
ard P. Dziubak to eighty-one months in state prison after he
pleaded guilty to second-degree manslaughter. 3 Fifteen months
1. THE SPANGENBERG GRoup, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE
OF MINNESOTA BOARD OF PUBLIC DEFENSE-DRAFT REPORT 37 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter SPANGENBERG REPORT] (on file with the Minnesota Law Review). According
to one commentator, "[vlirtually no assigned counsel program in the country is
adequately funded. In fact the funding situation nationally is frequently and
accurately characterized as a crisis." Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsel: Is the Rep-
resentation Effective?, CRIm. JusT., Summer 1989, at 16, 18. Another writer
noted that "[t]he phrase 'assembly-line justice' has been used over the years to
describe the operations of urban public defender offices." Richard Klein, The
Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled To Render the Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363, 390 n.175 (1993).
On April 2, 1992, William R. Kennedy, Chief Public Defender of Hennepin
County, filed a lawsuit charging that the state and county unconstitutionally
failed to provide the public defender with adequate funding. Kennedy v. Carl-
son, No. 92-6860 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 2, 1992); County P. D. in Minnesota Sues
to Force Increase in Funding, 6 BNA CRmuNAL PRACTICE MANUAL 204 (1992).
The case against the state is currently pending in district court.
2. Michael B. Mushlin, Forward, Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What
Does the Right to Counsel Guarantee Today?, 10 PACE L. Rv. 327, 331 (1990).
3. On February 27, 1987, the Ramsey County Attorney charged Dziubak
with second degree murder and first degree manslaughter in the death of his
mother, May Speiser. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771
(Minn. 1993) (No. C7-91-2517). On February 25, 1987, Dziubak claimed he
found Speiser dead in her bedroom. Id. at 1. During the autopsy, the medical
examiner discovered a note, allegedly written by Speiser, indicating that Dzi-
ubak had killed her by throwing her down the basement stairs. Id. The medi-
cal examiner declared the death a homicide. Id. He determined the primary
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later, the district court vacated Dziubak's guilty plea, relying on
newly-discovered exculpatory evidence. 4 The prosecution then
charged and tried Dziubak for murder, but the jury acquitted
him.5
On June 19, 1991, Dziubak sued J. Thomas Mott and James
T. Hankes, the two Ramsey County Assistant Public Defenders 6
who represented him on the murder and manslaughter charges,
alleging ten counts of legal malpractice. 7 Mott and Hankes as-
serted that public defenders possess absolute immunity from
legal malpractice liability.8 The trial court rejected Mott's and
Hankes's immunity defense, 9 and the Minnesota Court of Ap-
cause of death to be blunt head trauma, consistent with falling down the base-
ment stairs. Id. After the trial, however, the lawyers discovered that the toxi-
cology report showed fatal levels of anti-depressants, indicative of suicide. Id.
at 3.
Dziubak's trial was originally scheduled to begin April 27, 1987. Id. at 2.
That day, J. Thomas Mott and James T. Hankes discussed possible plea negoti-
ations with Dziubak. Id. The next day, Dziubak pleaded guilty to one count of
second degree manslaughter. Id. He would later claim that his public defend-
ers coerced his admission. Id. at 3.
After the plea hearing, the trial judge departed downward from the 95-
month presumptive sentence, giving Dziubak 81 months in Stillwater prison.
Id. at 2.
4. On September 14, 1988, Dziubak retained a private lawyer to petition
the District Court to vacate his guilty plea. Id. at 2. Initially, Dziubak argued
that the guilty plea was defective because it lacked a factual basis and because
Hankes and Mott had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 2-3.
Later, Dziubak withdrew his ineffective counsel claim and sought to vacate his
guilty plea based on newly discovered exculpatory evidence regarding the high
levels of anti-depressants recorded in the toxicology report. Id. at 3. The court
vacated the guilty plea because of the new evidence and did not rule on the
ineffective assistance claim. Id.
5. Id. at 3.
6. The Ramsey County District Court appointed the Ramsey County Pub-
lic Defender's Office to represent Dziubak. Id. at 2. Subsequently, the public
defender's office assigned Hankes and Mott as co-counsel. Id.
7. See Petitioner's Brief at 3-4, Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn.
1993) (No. C7-91-2517). Dziubak alleged that Hankes and Mott had failed to
investigate his case adequately, neglected to test vital pieces of evidence, inade-
quately prepared an expert for trial, failed to develop fully the expert's informa-
tion, failed to allow the expert sufficient time to prepare the medical defense,
failed to secure character witnesses against decedent Speiser, failed to disclose
the expert's original opinion, unreasonably coerced Dziubak, failed to ask for a
continuance based upon a conversation with the expert, and failed to fully in-
form Dziubak of the legal implications of entering his guilty plea. Id.
8. See Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 773 (Minn. 1993). Mott and
Hankes also claimed the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded litigation of
Dziubak's claim that they had negligently failed to discover the exculpatory evi-
dence. Id.
9. Id. The court, however, granted the defendants' collateral estoppel
claim. Id. The district court had found Hankes and Mott were not negligent for
978
PUBLIC DEFENDER IMMUNITY
peals affirmed. 10 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court, holding that public defenders enjoy absolute im-
munity from legal malpractice suits." The Dziubak court justi-
fied its holding entirely on public policy grounds. 12
Dziubak raises the issue of the viability and propriety of ex-
tending common-law malpractice immunity to public defenders.
Resolution of this issue materially affects not only public defend-
ers, but also the large number of indigents that the state prose-
cutes in Minnesota courts each year.13 Extending immunity
deprives indigent defendants of an important monetary remedy
for inadequate assistance of counsel, leaving them virtually no
civil recourse against incompetent attorneys,' 4 and contributes
to the public defenders' image as second-class lawyers.
Court-appointed counsel deliver the vast majority of crimi-
nal defense services. 15 Public defenders and other court-ap-
pointed counsel litigate most of these cases in the state court
system.' 6 Most states, however, have not specifically addressed
the issues of liability or common-law immunity as they apply to
public defender negligence. 17 State courts that have considered
the issue have generally done so under a statutory or functional
failing to discover the toxicological evidence; thus, the court found that collat-
eral estoppel prohibited relitigation of Hankes's and Motes alleged lack of due
diligence in failing to find the exculpatory evidence. Dziubak v. Mott, 486
N.W.2d 837, 842 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
10. Dziubak, 486 N.W.2d at 841. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted
review solely to determine whether public defenders in Minnesota possess abso-
lute immunity from legal malpractice actions. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 773.
The court decided Dziubak as a case of first impression. Id. at 774.
11. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 773.
12. Id.
13. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CZHNAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1992, 426 (1993) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK]; PROGRAM EVALUATION DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE Au-
DITOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER SYsTEM 4 (1992) [hereinafter PUBLIC DEFENDER
SYSTEM].
14. See infra Part I.D (describing the limited remedies available to indi-
gent defendants).
15. See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel:
The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L.
REV. 531, 532 n.3 (1988). Klein estimated that public defenders provide 65% of
criminal defense services. Id. In Minnesota, the percentage is slightly lower.
PUBLIC DEFENDER SYsTEM, supra note 13, at 4.
16. In 1991, federal district courts heard only 45,215 criminal cases.
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 494. In contrast, State courts handed down
829,344 felony convictions in 1990. Id. at 527. In 1991, the police made
14,211,900 arrests. Id. at 422. In Minnesota alone, the police made 136,192
criminal arrests in 1991. Id. at 426.
17. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Nev. 1974).
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analysis.18 The Dziubak decision may adversely affect future
consideration of immunity because it asserted, without citing
empirical evidence, that absolute immunity will improve repre-
sentation, promote professionalism, and ease the burden on
overworked defenders.
This Comment addresses Dziubak's ramifications for indi-
gent criminal defendants and the public defenders who repre-
sent them. Part I explains the history of criminal indigent
jurisprudence and the right to effective assistance of counsel,
outlines the system of indigent criminal representation in Min-
nesota and charts the history of liability, immunity, and indem-
nity in relation to criminal legal malpractice. Part II describes
the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in Dziubak. Part III
analyzes Dziubak's weaknesses, in terms of public policy and
case law, and elucidates its impact both on indigent defendants
in Minnesota and on the court-appointed counsel obligated to
represent them.
In response to Dziubak, this Comment proposes a two-pro-
nged solution which advocates that the Minnesota legislature
expressly extend to public defenders limited statutory liability
as state employees and recommends that courts in Minnesota
establish a modified evidentiary threshold for proving ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel for defendants represented by court-
appointed counsel. This two-pronged solution would establish a
limited, but effective, remunerative device for dissatisfied indi-
gent defendants that balances the professional needs of lawyers,
the constitutional needs of indigent defendants, and the con-
cerns of the courts and the legislature.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE PUBLIC
DEFENDER: INTERESTS IN CONFLICT?
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL
JURISPRUDENCE
In 1932, the Supreme Court established the constitutional
right of certain defendants to appointed counsel.1 9 In Powell v.
18. Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975); Browne v. Robb, 583
A.2d 949 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991); Vick v. Haller, 512 A.2d
249 (Del. Super. Ct.), affd mem., 514 A.2d 782 (Del. 1986); Donigan v. Finn, 290
N.W.2d 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d
103 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979).
19. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). The Sixth Amendment
states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...
have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
980 [Vol. 78:977
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Alabama,20 the Court held that "the necessity of counsel was so
vital and imperative [in capital cases] that the failure . . .to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial
of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."21 Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,2 2 the Court ex-
tended Powell and held that the Sixth Amendment requires
appointment of counsel in all federal-court felony cases for indi-
gent defendants. 23 Subsequently, in Gideon v. Wainwright,24
the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment obligates
states to provide defense counsel to indigent defendants in all
felony prosecutions. 25
Minnesota Constitution also requires that "[iun all prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the assistance of counsel in his defense." MMSN.
CONST. art. 1, § 6.
Many state courts have interpreted their state constitutions as providing
greater protections than afforded by United States Constitution. See generally
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HIRv. L. REv. 489 (1977) (noting "[ilt is simply that the decisions of
the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights
guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law").
20. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
21. Id. at 71. The Court declined to adopt a sweeping rule that appointed
counsel is required in all capital cases. Id. Rather, the Court limited its hold-
ing to those defendants who are "incapable of madng [their] own defense be-
cause of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like .... " Id.
22. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
23. Id. at 463. The Zerbst Court explained its holding:
[T~he obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the pro-
fessional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal
with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple,
orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman may ap-
pear intricate, complex and mysterious.
Id. at 462-63.
Four years later, the Supreme Court declined to incorporate against the
states the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in felony cases. Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The Court held that states must provide appointed counsel only when the spe-
cial circumstances of the case indicated that the assistance of counsel was
needed to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 461.
24. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. Id. at 343-44. In overruling Betts, the Court stated, "[the assistance of
counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to
insure fimdamental human rights ...." Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)) (alteration in original). The Gideon Court extended
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 339-41.
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B. THE EMERGENCE OF MINNESOTA'S PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM
AFTER GIDEON
Before Gideon, volunteer legal service agencies and uncom-
pensated attorneys generally represented the small number of
indigent defendants for whom courts appointed counsel in crimi-
nal proceedings. 26 Gideon and its progeny,27 however, produced
a wave of state legislative activity in the 1960s and 1970s, creat-
ing public-defender offices and similar mechanisms to ensure
compliance with the Constitution. 28
Today, state law dictates indigent representation structures
at the state and, generally, the local level.29 Both state and local
funds support indigent defense systems.30 Most jurisdictions
operate one of the following systems: some jurisdictions employ
comprehensive, full-time public defender offices, 31 some rely on
26. See William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel, in THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED IN LAw AND ACTION 147, 149-50 (Stuart S. Nagel ed., 1972); Suzanne
E. Mounts & Richard J. Wilson, Systems for Providing Indigent Defense: An
Introduction, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193, 197-98 (1986).
27. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (finding the right to
counsel for misdemeanor prosecutions); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)
(establishing the right to counsel for all post-charge witness-suspect confronta-
tions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (extending due process protection to
juveniles in delinquency proceedings leading to possible incarceration); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (extending right of counsel to pre-charge
police interrogations); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause entitles defendant to an at-
torney on first appeal).
28. See generally NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CmMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE
POOR: METHODS AND PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND
THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING (1982) (reporting on state and county indi-
gent defense systems); BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 1 (1982) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY]
(same).
Few public defender programs existed in the United States prior to Gideon.
SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. These pre-Gideon programs were
either the product of well-meaning lawyers and activists or state constitutions
and statutes creating the right to counsel. Id. These early programs were gen-
erally small and staffed only part-time. Id.
29. See generally LEFSTEIN, supra note 28 (describing statutorily created
public defense systems); NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 28 (same); Mounts & Wil-
son, supra note 26 (same).
30. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 28, at 10-24, A1-A104; NATIONAL STUDY,
supra note 28, at 23.
31. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 28, at C1-C39; NATIONAL STUDY, supra note
28, at 14-16; see also Mounts & Wilson, supra note 26, at 198-99 (describing the
origins of public defender offices).
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court-appointed counsel from the local private bar, either com-
pensated or pro bono,3 2 and some rely on a contract system.33
In 1965, the Minnesota legislature created a system of full-
time and part-time defender offices to meet indigent criminal de-
fense needs.3 4 Since that time, the legislature has made signifi-
cant structural and organizational changes. 35 In 1981, the
legislature created the State Board of Public Defense and
charged it with appointing a state public defender 36 and chief
32. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 28, at B1-B38; NATIONAL STUDy, supra note
28, at 16-19; see also Mounts & Wilson, supra note 26, at 198 (describing court
appointment of private attorneys). An assigned-counsel system relies on the
appointment of different lawyers from the bar at large. The indigent defendant
represented by appointed or assigned counsel often encounter difficulty because
the attorney generally does not receive funds for investigation; typically, as-
signed counsel receive a flat hourly rate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006a(d) (1988). But
see 18 U.S.C. § 3006(e)(1) (stating that "counsel may request compensation for
investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense...").
33. NATIONAL SrUDY, supra note 28, at 19-21. In Washington state, for ex-
ample, the government finding source contracts with individual attorneys or
private law firms to provide criminal indigent legal representation. See Robert
C. Boruchowitz, Remarks, in GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRisis IN INDIGENT DE-
FENSE FUNDING 12 (1982); PuBLIc DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 51-52;
see also Mounts & Wilson, supra note 26, at 199-200 (describing the contract
system).
34. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 869, §§ 1-20, 1965 Minn. Laws 1631-39 (codi-
fied as amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 611.14-.21, .23-.26, .27 (1992)). In 1917, the
Minnesota legislature created public defender offices in counties with popula-
tions of at least 300,000. Act of April 21, 1917, ch. 496, §§ 1-7, 1917 Minn. Laws
835-36 (codified as amended at MiNN. STAT. § 611.12 (1988)), repealed by Act of
June 3, 1989, ch. 335, art. 3, § 57(2), 1989 Minn. Laws 2932.
Under Minnesota law, anyone accused of a felony, gross misdemeanor, or
probation or parole violation is entitled to representation, including juveniles.
MnN. STAT. § 611.14. The court appoints public defenders to represent crimi-
nal defendants who cannot afford to pay for a private attorney. Id. § 611.18.
Judges determine if a defendant is indigent. Id. § 611.17. In 1990, public de-
fender offices handled almost 75% of the felony docket and over 50% of the gross
misdemeanor docket in Minnesota. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 13,
at 4. The percentages were higher in the districts encompassing Minneapolis
and St. Paul. Id. Compensated court-appointed counsel or private, nonprofit
public defense corporations handle the remainder of indigent representation
needs in Minnesota. Id. at 20-27. Five such public defense corporations oper-
ate in the state. Id. at 21.
35. See MINN. STAT. §§ 611.14-.35; PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note
13, at 11-17. Currently in Minnesota, public defense corporations and court-
appointed private lawyers represent a small percentage of the indigent criminal
accused. Id. at 20-27.
36. MINN. STAT. § 611.25; PuBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 22.
The state public defender office in Minnesota handles appellate cases. See
MIN. STAT. § 611.25(1).
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public defenders in six of the ten judicial districts.37 The legisla-
ture expanded the authority of the State Public Defender in
1987,38 and in 1990, further incorporated all ten judicial dis-
tricts into the state funding system.39
C. THREATENING GDEOlsr's GUARANTEE: THE CuRRENT CRisis
IN INDIGENT DEFENSE
Nationally, and in Minnesota, the move toward establishing
defender services did not solve the problem of ensuring fair and
adequate legal representation for indigent criminal clients.40
Most commentators agree that the public defender offices, espe-
cially those offices located in the large urban districts, are un-
37. MINN. STAT. §§ 611.12, .215, .26; see PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra
note 13, at 24.
38. In 1987, the legislature expanded the statutory authority for the Board
of Public Defense by modifying its membership, creating an administrative of-
fice, instituting greater oversight of the State Public Defender's office, creating
two new Judicial District Public Defender offices, mandating new standards
regulating the offices and conduct of all public defender organizations, and es-
tablishing new reporting, budgeting, and funding processes. Act of May 26,
1987, ch. 250 §§ 1-18, 1987 Minn. Laws 889-98 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. §§ 611.215-.27); PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 11-17.
39. In 1989, the legislature expanded the authority of the Board of Public
Defense to include all ten judicial districts in Minnesota. Act of June 3, 1989,
ch. 335, art. 1 § 262, 1989 Minn. Laws 2897 (codified as amended at MiNN.
STAT. § 611.215(2)); PUBLIc DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 12, 14. The
legislature also appropriated $17,000,000 of state funds to provide representa-
tion for felony and gross misdemeanor cases throughout the state and for juve-
nile and misdemeanor cases in the second, fourth, and eighth judicial districts.
SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. Although this sum may seem consid-
erable, the city of Washington D.C. received approximately the same amount
for its non-federal indigent criminal defense allocation in 1990, which totalled
$16,542,000. DIsmwcT OF COLUMBIA CouRTs ANNuAL REPORT 1990, at 11
(1990). The District of Columbia has a mixed system of public defenders and
court-appointed counsel. NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 28, at 65.
40. LEFSTEIN, supra note 28, at ii; SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
As a result of changes in the criminal law landscape over the last three decades,
"public defender caseloads have grown to be overwhelming in many jurisdic-
tions, and the ability to provide 'effective representation' has been stretched to
the limit." Id.
Justice Marshall spoke to the dilemma of drawing a public defender in his
dissent in Strickland:
It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a person of means, by
selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thor-
oughly, usually can obtain better representation than that available to
an indigent defendant, who must rely on appointed counsel, who, in
turn has limited time and resources to devote to a given case.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
984
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derfunded,41 understaffed,42 and carry unreasonably high
caseloads. 43 Due in part to the "war on crime" and the "war on
drugs,"'4 the number of people arrested and prosecuted in the
criminal justice system increased exponentially during the
1980s.4 5 The budgets for indigent criminal defense, however,
did not grow commensurate with the rising caseloads in the pub-
lic defender offices. 46 Additionally, increases in the public de-
41. LEFSTE IN, supra note 28, at 10-24. Minnesota appropriated only $19.8
million for public defense in Fiscal Year 1991. PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM, supra
note 13, at 1.
42. In 1990, Minnesota's ten judicial district offices employed 89 full-time
and 172 part-time public defenders. SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
Hennepin County employed 68 of the 89 full time public defenders. Id. The
study made the following determinations:
Without question, the strength of the public defender system in Minne-
sota can be found in the staff across each judicial district. Public de-
fenders in Minnesota, with very few exceptions, are competent,
committed and first-rate advocates.
They are among the most experienced criminal practitioners in the
state and... in many instances, they were the most experienced crimi-
nal practitioners in some of the counties where they practiced. Fur-
thermore, public defenders are respected as competent, strong
advocates by both judges and prosecutors.
Id. at 19.
43. Public defender caseloads have grown exponentially in recent years
due to a variety of factors, including: increasing crime rates, case filing, and
court appointments, especially drug offenses; deteriorating economic conditions
leading to increased claims of indigency; an increase in the types of cases and
proceedings for which counsel is required; changes in prosecutorial practices,
especially limits on plea bargaining in certain cases; changes in methods of case
disposition or the stage at which cases are disposed; changes in the case compo-
sition for public defenders, with an increased percentage of more serious felo-
nies; increasing use of mandatory minimum sentences and use of sentencing
guidelines; increasing court efficiency; and procedural alterations, such as
speedier trials or preliminary hearings for certain classes of offenses. SPANGEN-
BERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
44. See President's Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY Co m. PREs.
Doo. 1249, 1249-50 (Oct. 2, 1982); President's Remarks Announcing Federal
Initiatives Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, 18 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 1311, 1313-14 (Oct. 14, 1982). The Reagan and Bush administra-
tions both pursued the policies known as the "war on crime" and the "war on
drugs." These policy initiatives emphasized bolstering law enforcement,
prosecutorial, and sentencing powers in an effort to stem the rising wave of
drug-related activity and increasingly violent crime. See Sheldon Krantz &
Laurie Robinson, Report to Members, Car. JUST., Winter 1990, at front cover,
48; john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The Na-
tional Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
557 (1991).
45. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 485.
46. At the federal level, for instance, direct expenditures during the 1980s
to prosecution services increased 470.4% while direct expenditures to public de-
fense increased only 68.9%. Id. at 3. By 1990, expenditures to prosecution serv-
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fender budget over the last twenty years did not correspond to
the increase in arrests and prosecutions or compare with the in-
crease in the growth of law enforcement and prosecution
agencies.47
In Hennepin County, which encompasses the city of Minne-
apolis, for example, less than 100 full and part-time public de-
fenders represent approximately 30,000 adult criminal and
juvenile defendants each year.48 Nearby Ramsey County suffers
an even more serious caseload crisis.49 Reflecting the national
trend, an increasing percentage of the defendants in Minnesota
face felony and gross misdemeanor drug charges.50 Minnesota
also spends a far greater amount of money on prosecution serv-
ices than on public defense. 5'
Difficult social and political considerations complicate any
critique of the delivery and adequacy of indigent criminal repre-
sentation.5 2 Courts have declined to recognize indigents as a
ices at all levels greatly exceeded the funds allocated to public defense. See id.
at 2.
47. Nationally, the amount of public defense expenditures comprised less
than 3% of the total criminal justice expenditures, less than half the amount
spent on prosecution. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 3. Minnesota spent
$821,228,000 on the criminal justice system including $387,009,000 on police
services and $77,941,000 on prosecution, while spending only $17,941,000 on
public defense. Id. at 4. In addition, the state of Minnesota employs 1,499 peo-
ple in its prosecution services and only 307 full-time public defense workers.
Id. at 26.
48. In 1991, the Hennepin County Public Defender's Office employed less
than 90 attorneys, but handled 27,002 new cases. HENNEPIN CoUNTrY PuBLIc
DEFENDER OFFICE: ORGANIZATIONAL SUMMARY, B-1 (1992) [hereinafter ORGANI.
ZATIONAL SuMMARY]; see also SouRcEBooK, supra note 13, at 375-76 (listing
crime statistics for St. Paul and Minneapolis).
Public defenders represent at least 80% of all felony criminal defendants in
Minnesota's two most populated counties, Hennepin and Ramsey, which encom-
pass Minneapolis and St. Paul, respectively. Margaret Zack, State Court to
Look at Indigent's Right to Sue Defenders, STAR TRIB. (Mpls.), Feb. 8, 1993, at
Al.
49. See SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-31.
50. See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 13, at 485. The number of defendants
prosecuted in federal district courts for drug offenses more than tripled between
1980 and 1990. Id. In addition, by 1992, drug offenders comprised the single
largest group of felony arrestees in the 75 largest counties in the country. Id. at
532.
51. See supra note 47 (describing the budgets for prosecution and public
defense in Minnesota).
52. "A defender program operates in a context which is, by and large, hos-
tile to its purpose-providing representation to people charged with committing
a crime." Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Respon-
sibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 473, 475. "The ap-
parent contradiction between reform origins of the defender program idea and
986
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"suspect class" deserving of heightened scrutiny under the Con-
stitution.53 Also, indigent defendants, who are disproportion-
ately persons of color,54 are generally less able to effectively use
the political process. 55 Furthermore, legislators rarely give high
priority to the rights of criminal suspects. 56 If the public per-
ceives a politician as pro-defendant, he or she risks losing votes
to "law-and-order" candidates on issues such as criminal
rights.57 Voters are often far more concerned with building
larger prisons, establishing stiffer sentences, and increasing po-
lice forces than with ensuring the vigorous defense of criminal
defendant rights and prisoner rights.58
the recurrent criticism of today's defender programs is a product of the political
and social environment in which such programs exist." Id. at 481.
53. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(holding that school children residing in poor school district are not a suspect
class because of their economic circumstances). This lack of constitutional pro-
tection for indigents is becoming even more significant because "[o]ver the past
few years, for reasons not totally explainable, the percentage of defendants
found to be indigent and receiving appointed counsel has grown. We were re-
peatedly told around the state that the indigency rate has risen to 80% and
above" for all defendants. SPANGENBERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
The Dziubak decision may also have constitutional implications in this re-
gard in the future. As one commentator explained:
However overworked the system as a whole may be, the constitutional
rights of an individual charged with a crime cannot be sacrificed. The
longer status quo continues, the more likely it becomes that ineffective
representation will be the norm and, therefore, expected and tolerated.
Excessive caseloads may explain why defenders cannot provide compe-
tent assistance to their clients, but this explanation must never serve
to justify and perpetuate our inadequate system for the delivery of de-
fense services.
Klein, Competent Representation, supra note 15, at 564 (emphasis in original).
54. In 1990, slightly over one million people lived in Hennepin County; ra-
cial minorities totaled 110,110 or 10.6%. ORGANIZATIONAL SUmIARY, supra note
48, at B-1. That year, however, racial minorities represented approximately
60% of the felony, gross misdemeanor, and misdemeanor caseload of the Henne-
pin County Public Defender office. Id.
55. See Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45
U. MLI" L. REv. 107 (1990).
56. One commentator pointed out that "it is almost inconceivable that
elected politicians would call for or provide additional funding to represent indi-
gents accused of crime." Klein, Eleventh Commandment, supra note 1, at 432.
57. For example, Michael Dukakis suffered greatly in the presidential elec-
tion of 1988 for supporting a prisoner furlough program in Massachusetts while
governor, which enabled prisoner Willie Horton to commit a rape during a fur-
lough release. See Ted Gest, The Campaign Goes on Furlough, U.S. NEws &
WoRLD REP., Oct. 3, 1988, at 16.
58. See The Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society, The
Crisis in Our Criminal Justice System, CRIm. JUST., Winter 1990, at 18.
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D. LAWYER ACcoUNTABILITY: EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, AND IbmMNiTY
Few methods exist to hold criminal defense lawyers in Min-
nesota accountable for inadequate representation. Dissatisfied
criminal defendants in the state system may collaterally attack
their conviction or seek monetary recompense for incompetent
counsel. At the state level, criminal defendants can complain to
the board of professional responsibility, 59 bring an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim for collateral relief,60 or initiate a
civil suit for legal malpractice to collect money damages. 61 At
the federal level, a criminal defendant in a state system can ini-
tiate a civil-rights action to collect money damages 62 or petition
for federal habeas relief.6 3 Each of these remedies, however,
presents obstacles for the indigent criminal defendant.64
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in State Court
A dissatisfied client may seek non-monetary collateral relief
by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. This right is impor-
tant because counsel in criminal cases risk a client's liberty.65
59. See infra part I.D.2 (describing the ethics complaint process and
problems for criminal defendants). See generally MINNESOTA RuLEs OF PROFEs.
SIONAL CONDUCT (1992) (providing rules for attorney behavior); MINNESOTA
RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1992) (same). "Ethical codes
governing the professional conduct of all attorneys must be the starting point of
any discussion regarding public defender caseload management." SPANGEN-
BERG REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
60. See infra part I.D.1 (describing ineffective assistance of counsel).
61. See infra part I.D.4 (describing state malpractice suits). Litigants
seeking to sue their lawyers for legal malpractice encounter great difficulty
finding another lawyer to represent them. Lawyers have traditionally been un-
willing to sue fellow members of the bar for malpractice; however, this tradition
may be changing. See, e.g., KAY OSTBERG, DIRECTORY OF LAWYER WHO SUE
LAWYERS (1989) (providing state-by-state listings of the few lawyers who are
willing to sue other lawyers).
62. See infra part I.D.3 (describing federal civil rights remedies under 42
U.S.C. § 1983). Civil rights suits were once the most popular form of redress for
indigent clients unhappy with public defender representation. Ronald E. Mal-
len, The Court-Appointed Lawyer and Legal Malpractice-Liability or Immu-
nity, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 59, 59 (1976).
63. See infra part I.D.3 (describing relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
64. See generally infra part I.D (noting pitfalls to various monetary and
collateral remedies).
65. See DuKE NORDLINGER STERN & Jo ANN FELIX-R=ETKE, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 3.07, at 40-41 (1993); RONALD E.
MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 2 LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 21.1, at 284 (3d ed.
1989).
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In Strickland v. Washington,66 the United States Supreme
Court held that the right to "reasonably effective assistance of
counsel" requires that all criminal defendants have the right to
challenge their conviction on grounds of incompetent legal
assistance.67 The Strickland Court further held that the dissat-
isfied defendant must prove that the representation of counsel
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 68 and that, in
the absence of the lawyer's unprofessional errors, the result of
the criminal proceeding would have been different.69 The Court
also directed that in these matters there is a "strong presump-
tion" that counsel's conduct fell within the range of reasonably
effective assistance. 70
66. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). On the same day, the Court held that a defendant
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate actual ineffective-
ness to warrant Sixth Amendment protection. United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648 (1984).
67. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654-55. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the right to counsel means the right to "effective
assistance of counsel." See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14
(1970).
68. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91. 'The proper standard for judging attor-
ney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the
circumstances ... [tihe defendant must show that the lawyer's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 669.
69. Id. at 691-96. "With regard to the required showing of prejudice, the
proper standard requires defendant to show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different." Id. at 669.
A defendant's right to counsel extends only to the first appeal and does not
encompass suits claiming ineffective assistance in state court. See Penn-
sylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (denying constitutional right to counsel
to mount a collateral attack on ineffectiveness of counsel). A state court may
mandate that state or local authorities provide an attorney to indigents seeking
to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but the U.S. Constitution
does not guarantee this right.
One commentator pointed out problems with bringing an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claim at the post-conviction stage:
[Post conviction relief] fails to remedy errors of omission resulting from
staff and resource shortages. It may correct flagrant errors, but it can-
not reach claims never brought and strategies never used. Because
claims are case specific, the use of this approach precludes criminal
defendants from raising structural challenges to improve indigent de-
fense systems.
Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunc-
tion to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 486 (1991).
70. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The Court, however, did not specifically
address this presumption of effectiveness in the context of an overburdened de-
fender office.
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Most courts interpreting Strickland have made this a diffi-
cult standard for dissatisfied defendants to meet.71 Indeed, the
Minnesota courts have overturned only a handful of convictions
on appeal in the last decade due to ineffective assistance of
counsel.72
71. See, e.g., State v. Grover, 402 N.W.2d 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (find-
ing counsel rendered effective assistance under Strickland even though counsel
failed to interview several witnesses, failed to obtain statements from witnesses
he did question until the day before trial, failed to discuss the case with defend-
ant more than briefly, failed to make motions for hearings to challenge the va-
lidity of warrant and admissibility of prejudicial statement, and impliedly
admitted defendant's guilt on the issue of terroristic threats). See generally
Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules and Standards in State
Courts as to Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client, 2
A-L.R. 4TH (1980 & Supp. 1993) (discussing standards for ineffective counsel
cases in state courts); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense
Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client Regarding Plea Bargaining, 8
A.L.R. 4TH 660 (1980 & Supp. 1993) (discussing ineffective counsel with regards
to plea bargaining); John E. Theuman, Annotation, When is Attorney's Repre-
sentation of Criminal Defendant so Deficient as to Constitute Denial of Federal
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel--Supreme Court Cases,
83 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1987) (discussing ineffective counsel standards for federal
cases). One commentator described Strickland's two-prong test as "far less a
standard for effective assistance of counsel than a standard for disposing of ef-
fective assistance of counsel claims." Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 80 (1986). Most states, though, have ignored any
innovative proposals for ensuring competent counsel. For a few examples of
such proposals see Klein, Competent Representation, supra note 15, at 564-84.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has broken ranks and set a modi-
fied standard for effective assistance counsel, in particular for public defenders.
See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). Responding to drastic measures
that the criminal courts had adopted, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered the
trial court, when hearing cases in which defendants made ineffective assistance
claims at the pre-trial stage, to hold a hearing for each defendant and to apply a
rebuttable presumption that the indigent defendants are not receiving constitu-
tionally sufficient assistance of counsel. Id. at 783. The Peart court further
ordered that if the trial court, applying the rebuttable presumption and weigh-
ing all the evidence, finds that the indigent is receiving ineffective assistance,
even if due to case overload, the trial court shall not permit the trial to take
place. Id. The attorney representing Peart was, at the time, handling 70 active
felony cases, and had represented 418 clients in an eight-month span during
which defendant's trial was conducted. Id. at 784.
72. This author could locate only a few cases at the appellate stage that
found ineffective assistance of counsel in the State of Minnesota in the last
twenty-five years. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1990); Gates
v. State, 393 N.W.2d 417 (Minn. 1986). This is comparable to the national num-
bers. See Stephen B. Bright et. al., Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away,
CRIm. JUST., Winter 1990, at 10, 12 (emphasizing that Strickland and other
barriers to finding ineffective assistance of counsel guarantee that conviction
reversals will be too few to provoke systemic change).
As a remedy, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are usually brought by
persons challenging criminal trial convictions. WAYNE R. LEFAvE & JEROLD H.
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2. Board of Lawyers Professional Responsibility
In Minnesota, complaining of attorney incompetence to the
state board of professional responsibility does not provide a real-
istic remedy to dissatisfied indigent criminal clients.7 3 The Min-
nesota Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility severely
limit investigations of complaints by criminal defendants.7 4
This process affords indigent defendants no remedy to replace
inadequate counsel before any damage is done.
3. Federal Claims: Civil Rights Actions and Habeas Petitions
Federal remedies offer dissatisfied clients little solace.
Most federal courts have held state public defenders immune
from civil rights suits75 because public defenders do not act
under the color of state law in discharging their duties.76 As a
result, civil rights suits do not provide a viable means by which
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 28-29 (1992). Because the vast majority of crimi-
nal accused agree to plea bargains and do not go to trial, id. § 21.1, the percent-
age of persons to whom this remedy is effectively available is quite small.
Klein, Competent Representation, supra note 15, at 547.
73. See RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrrY, Rule 8(b); see
also infra notes 185-190 and accompanying text (explaining ethical ramifica-
tions of inadequate counsel).
74. RULES ON LAwyERS PROFEssIONAL REsPoNsIBILrrY, Rule 8(b).
No investigation shall commence on a complaint by or on behalf of a
party represented by court appointed counsel, insofar as the complaint
against the court appointed attorney alleges incompetent representa-
tion by the attorney in the pending matter. Any such complaint shall
be summarily dismissed without prejudice. The Director's dismissal
shall inform the complainant that the complaint may be sent to the
chief district judge or trial court judge involved in the pending matter.
The judge may, at any time, refer the matter to the Director for investi-
gation. The Director may communicate with the appropriate court re-
garding the complaint and its disposition.
Id.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 suits provide several benefits:
plaintiffs may file them pro se, indigent plaintiffs do not need to pay a filing fee,
and a litigant who prevails may collect attorney's fees. Richard Klein, Legal
Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of the Indigent Defend-
ant, 61 TEAiP. L. REV. 1171, 1198 (1988). The applicable text of § 1983 reads as
follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
76. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). The Polk Court held that
a public defender, when engaged in the traditional defense functions as counsel
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:977
most indigent defendants can seek monetary damages for in-
competent court-appointed counsel. Obtaining federal collateral
relief for incompetent counsel is even more difficult. Only pris-
oners who have exhausted their state remedies can bring habeas
petitions.77 Worse yet, habeas petitions alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel rarely succeed.78
4. State Tort Action for Malpractice
In most jurisdictions, criminal defendants may bring civil
legal malpractice suits against attorneys.7 9 Although such suits
are not rare, legal malpractice is a relatively undeveloped
area.80 While suits brought by criminal defendants against
their defense counsel do not comprise a large part of the legal
malpractice landscape,8 ' they are increasing in frequency.8 2
for an indigent defendant, does not act under color of state law for purposes of
§ 1983. Id. at 325. The Court did not reach the immunity issue.
In contrast, the Court declined immunity for a public defender who con-
spired with a prosecutor to deprive indigent defendants of their constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 916 (1984). The
Court reasoned that if private lawyers would not be immune from intentional
misconduct actions, public defenders should not receive immunity either. Id. at
921. The Court also declined to extend immunity to public defenders because of
any similarity between public defenders and prosecutors and judges. Id. at 922.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) (dealing with applications on behalf of persons
detained under state court authority).
78. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (finding that success-
ful habeas petitions alleging incompetent assistance of counsel must still meet
the Strickland test).
The percentage of state prisoners granted some form of federal habeas re-
lief is extremely low. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES REPORT No. 7, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE JUDGEMENTS 32-35 (1988).
79. In a legal malpractice action, a complainant must allege and prove that
an attorney's acts or omissions were illegally erroneous, that the attorney's er-
rors were not reasonably tactical and did not comport with a reasonable stan-
dard of care, and that the negligent error or errors caused a compensable injury
to the complainant. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 65, § 27 (explicating the
litigation of legal malpractice actions).
80. "[L]egal malpractice claims, particularly those based on professional
negligence, did not become a subject of significance for the legal profession until
the 1970s. Until then, few practitioners were concerned about claims or the
cost of liability insurance." 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 65, § 1.6, at 17. "The
law of legal malpractice continues to evolve, but is doing so more on a national
level rather than by jurisdiction." Id. at 19.
81. Legal malpractice suits against criminal defense attorneys both nation-
wide and in Minnesota are still not filed in overwhelming numbers. Criminal
malpractice claims accounted for three percent of the total malpractice claims
recorded by 1986. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 65,§ 1.7, at 22 (quoting ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL Li-
ABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE, 8 (1986)). Criminal malpractice
992
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As stated above, federal courts have held that public defend-
ers are immune from federal civil rights actions. In Ferri v. Ack-
erman, 3 however, the Supreme Court held that the individual
states should decide the issue of public defender common-law
malpractice liability.8 4 In so ruling, the Ferri Court noted in
dicta that public defenders serve a role akin to privately-re-
tained defense counsel and therefore do not need immunity.8 5
At present, only a few states specifically protect public de-
fenders from legal malpractice liability.86 State courts that have
addressed the issue have generally declined to extend immunity
to public defenders.8 7 Most state courts analogize the relation-
ship between the public defender and the client to the relation-
ship between a privately-retained lawyer and client as the Court
in Ferri did.88 In Reese v. Danforth,8 9 for example, the Penn-
claims also account for the lowest monetary expenditure amounts for defense
and claims of all areas of law. Id. at 23. Over 90% of the criminal malpractice
defense costs were under $1000. Id.
Among attorneys, criminal defense attorneys face the smallest likelihood of
a legal malpractice action for negligence in handling a particular matter.
HILTON L. STEIN, HOW TO SUE YouR LAwYER: TIE CONSUIER GUIDE TO LEGAL
MALPRACTICE 41 (1989). The author noted that the small number of suits prob-
ably results not because criminal defense lawyers commit less malpractice than
civil lawyers, but because criminal defendants receive the least sympathy from
juries when complaining of legal malpractice. Id.
82. Civil legal malpractice suits against criminal attorneys have increased
in number, but appellate courts rarely affirm a judgment against an attorney.
2 MALLEN & SArrH, supra note 65, § 21.1, at 2845-86.
83. 444 U.S. 193 (1979). In Ferri, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of federal public defender immunity in state malpractice suits and unanimously
held that federal law does not entitle a counsel appointed in the federal court to
represent an indigent defendant to immunity when the former client sues for
malpractice in state court. Id.
84. Id. at 200-01.
85. Id. at 204-05.
86. See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text (describing different state
court treatment of immunity and limited liability of public defenders).
87. See, e.g., Spring v. Constantino, 363 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975); Reese v.
Danforth, 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979).
88. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (D. Nev. 1974).
The Sanchez court explained its holding:
The office of public defender is sui generis. Unlike other public offices,
it is not established to serve the public generally.... Recipients of the
services of a public defender's office are only those indigents in whose
aid a court or magistrate appoints a public defender to render legal
advice and assistance. As noted, the relationship thus created is a
strictly professional one. It is a personal relationship of trust and con-
fidence governed by the canons of professional ethics under which the
attorney owes an obligation of unswerving loyalty and devotion to the
interests of his client.
Id. at 1365.
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sylvania Supreme Court rejected the contention that public-pol-
icy concerns for protecting public defenders outweighed concerns
for an indigent client's ability to remedy insufficient representa-
tion.90 The Connecticut Supreme Court, in Spring v. Constan-
tino,91 reached a similar result, reasoning that a lawyer's
defense of an indigent accused is not a governmental act that
triggers immunity.92
A small number of jurisdictions have granted some form of
immunity to public defenders. 93 Either the state court inter-
prets its tort claims act as covering public defenders and court-
appointed counsel, as in Delaware, 94 or the state court extends
only qualified immunity to public defenders and court-appointed
counsel, as in New York.95 Until recently, the Minnesota courts
had not addressed the issue of public defender immunity,
although it had ruled on immunity for other actors in the judi-
cial sphere.96
89. 406 A.2d 735. In Reese, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that
once a public defender is appointed, any state or public function ceases, and the
public defender takes on all the obligations and protections of the private attor-
ney-client relationship. Id. at 738-39.
90. Id. at 739-40.
91. 362 A.2d 871. In Spring, the indigent client sued her Connecticut pub-
lic defender for negligently disclosing to the court his belief that she was insane.
Id. at 873. In the first case in the country to address the issue of public de-
fender immunity from state legal malpractice action, the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that a public defender is not a public official and therefore, defend-
ing an indigent client is not a governmental act which triggers immunity. Id. at
878-79. The court reasoned that a public defender is more like a privately-re-
tained attorney. Id. at 878; see also Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80, 82 (Mich.
App. 1980) (holding that public defender not immune in state malpractice
actions).
92. Spring, 362 A.2d at 871-872.
93. See, e.g, Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990); Vick v. Haller, 512
A.2d 249 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 343 (Nev. 1989);
Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
94. See, e.g., Browne, 583 A.2d at 951; Vick, 583 A.2d at 251-52 (holding
that state tort claims act bestows qualified immunity for state employees, in-
cluding court-appointed counsel and public defenders, but liability exists for du-
ties pursued in bad faith and with gross negligence); Ramirez, 773 P.2d at 344-
45 (finding that state statute prohibits lawsuits against "public officers" and
"officers" of the state, and public defenders held to be state employees within
the scope of "public officer" for discretionary acts pursuant to duty as public
defender).
95. See, e.g., Scott, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (finding public defenders not im-
mune from negligence suits arising out of ministerial tasks or clerical duties
which require no discretionary judgment).
96. Minnesota has granted immunity to a board of directors acting in
quasi-judicial capacity in arbitration, Melady v. South St. Paul Live Stock
Exch., 171 N.W. 806, 807 (Minn. 1919); judges, Stewart v. Cooley, 23 Minn. 347,
350 (1877); court commissioners and court-appointed examining physicians,
PUBLIC DEFENDER IMMUNITY
E. MINNESOTAS APPROACH TO GOvERNMiENTAL TORT LIBiLiTY
Under the Minnesota tort claims statute,97 the state will
pay compensation for injuries caused by an act or omission of an
employee of the state acting within the scope of office or employ-
ment.98 State employees shall not be liable for injuries caused
by ministerial acts or omissions exercised with due care 99 or for
discretionary acts or omissions.100 The statute limits compensa-
tory damages,' 0 ' prohibits the payment of punitive damages,' 0 2
and details circumstances under which liability protection is un-
available. 10 3 The legislature specifically categorized public de-
fenders, whether district public defenders or state public
defenders, as state employees for the purposes of tort liability
under this statute.10 4
II. DZIUBAK V. MOTT: PROTECTING PUBLIC
DEFENDERS FROM LEGAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS
On June 2, 1987, Richard Dziubak pleaded guilty to second
degree manslaughter. 10 5 Fifteen months later, the court va-
cated his guilty plea based on newly discovered exculpatory evi-
dence. 10 6 Subsequently, Dziubak was tried on murder charges
and acquitted. 10 7 After his acquittal, Dziubak sued his public
defenders for ten counts of legal malpractice stemming from the
proceeding that resulted in his imprisonment.10 8 The public de-
Linder v. Foster, 295 N.W. 299, 302 (Minn. 1940); and guardians ad litem, Tin-
dell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1988).
97. MIN. STAT. § 3.736 (1992) (covering state employees); see also MmIN.
STAT. § 466.01-.15 (1992) (covering municipal employees).
98. MmN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 1.
99. MnwN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3(a). The state and its employees are not
liable for "a loss caused by an act or omission of a state employee exercising due
care in the execution of a valid or invalid statute or rule." Id.
100. Mmmi. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3(b). The state and its employees are not
liable for "a loss caused by the performance or failure to perform a discretionary
duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." Id.
101. MIN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 4.
102. Mmmi. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 3.
103. MINN. STAT. § 3.736, subds. 1, 3, 9.
104. Mmi. STAT. § 3.732, subd. 1.
105. Petitioner's Brief at 2, Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993)
(No. C7-91-2517).
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3-4.
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fenders claimed absolute immunity from tort suit.10 9 The trial
court denied them the shield of absolute immunity11 0
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. 1 1' In denying immunity, the court reasoned that,
although valid policy concerns supported legal malpractice im-
munity for judges and prosecutors, no such policy reasons justi-
fies extending immunity to public defenders. 112 Judges and
prosecutors owe a primary duty to the community. 113 In con-
trast, public defenders owe a primary duty to their clients 114
and owe a secondary duty to the community. 115 The court rea-
soned that a public defender's duty to society as a whole, unlike
that of a prosecutors or judge, does not apply with enough force
to warrant the extension of absolute immunity to court-ap-
pointed lawyers."16 Unlike prosecutors and judges, the fear of
potential malpractice action does not conflict with a public de-
fender's primary duty to represent clients zealously. 117 The
court found persuasive the fact that as state employees, public
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id. at 2-3.
111. Dziubak v. Mott, 486 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 503
N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
112. Id. at 840. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Ferri v. Ackerman:
"There is, however, a marked difference between the nature of counsel's respon-
sibilities and those of other officers of the court. As public servants, the prose-
cutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole." 444 U.S. 193,
202-03 (1979) (citations omitted).
In contrast, the primary office performed by appointed counsel paral-
lels the office of privately retained counsel.... His principle responsi-
bility is to serve the undivided interests of his client. Indeed, an
indispensable element of the effective performance of his responsibili-
ties is the ability to act independently of the Government and to oppose
it in adversary litigation. The fear that an unsuccessful defense of a
criminal charge will lead to a malpractice claim does not conflict with
performance of that function. If anything, it provides the same incen-
tive for appointed and retained counsel to perform that fimction com-
petently. The primary rationale for granting immunity to judges,
prosecutors, and other public officers does not apply to defense counsel
sued for malpractice by his own client.
Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
Judicial immunity was originally designed to protect the integrity of the
judiciary. See, e.g., In re Clerk of Lyon County Courts' Compensation, 241
N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1976); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.W.2d 364, 368
(Minn. 1955).
113. FerN, 444 U.S. at 202-04.
114. Id. at 204.
115. Id.
116. Dziubak, 486 N.W.2d at 840.
117. Id. In fact, the court of appeals noted that the possibility of legal mal-
practice action might provide additional incentive for public defenders to serve
their clients undivided interests. Id. (citing FerN, 444 U.S. at 204).
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defenders have statutory defenses, :18 limited liability,11 9 and in-
demnification protection. 20 According to the court, because the
legislature enacted the state tort claims statute, it was the most
appropriate body to decide liability for public defenders.' 2 '
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the court of ap-
peals and held that public defenders are immune from suit for
legal malpractice. 22 The Dziubak court based its holding on
public policy considerations. 23 The court recognized the diffi-
cult circumstances under which public defenders must oper-
ate' 24 and reasoned that this difficult position necessitates
immunity. 25 The Dziubak court emphasized that public de-
fenders do not choose their clients and must represent all indi-
gent criminal defendants regardless of the public defender's
caseload or the degree of difficulty of the case.' 2 6
The Dziubak court also noted that public defender offices
are both "grossly under-funded" 2 7 and understaffed, 28 and de-
termined that court-appointed attorneys in Minnesota do an ad-
mirable job in spite of the financial constraints the current
system places on them.' 2 9 The court contended that the signifi-
cant differences between public defenders and privately-re-
tained counsel require the extension of immunity to public
118. Id.; see MuN. STAT. § 3.736, subd.3(a)-(p) (listing defenses which in-
clude protection for discretionary acts and ministerial acts performed with due
care).
119. 486 N.W.2d at 840, see MwN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 4.
120. 486 N.W.2d at 840-41; see MmN. STAT. § 3.736, subd. 9.
121. 486 N.W.2d at 840; see also Tower, 467 U.S. at 922-23 (stating that
Congress, not the Court, should decide whether excessive litigation warrants
granting state public defenders immunity from § 1983 conspiracy liability).
122. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 773 (Minn. 1993).
123. Id. The Dziubak court noted that 'it]ort immunity, the freedom from
suit or liability, is generally based on the idea that, though a defendant might
be negligent, important social values require that the defendant remain free of
liability." Id. at 774 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 131, at 1032 (5th ed. 1984)). The court did not address liability
under the Minnesota state tort claims act. See MIN. STAT. § 3.736.
124. Dzubiak, 503 N.W.2d at 775-76.
125. Id. at 776-77.
126. Id. at 775. The Dziubak court declared that public defenders in Minne-
sota are obligated to represent whomever they are assigned, regardless of cur-
rent caseload or the degree of difficulty the case presents. Id. This author,
however, found no case law or statutory provisions requiring public defenders
to accept cases regardless of caseload or degree of difficulty previous to the
court speaking in Dziubak.
127. Id. at 775-76.
128. Increased claims ofindigency and reduced state budgets limit the abil-
ity of public defenders to represent their clients. Id. at 776.
129. Id. at 777.
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defenders. 130 The court reasoned that "[tihe office of the public
defender does not have sufficient funds to represent each client
assigned to it in the way each client might demand to be
served."131
The court also emphasized that a public defender is ap-
pointed to protect the best interests of the indigent client and
must therefore be free to exercise independent discretion with-
out weighing every decision in terms of potential civil liabil-
ity.13 2 The court found immunity a more appropriate form of
protection than indemnity, because indemnity would still sub-
ject the public defender to potentially expensive and time-con-
suming litigation.133
Framing its decision squarely in terms of judicial efficiency,
the court asserted that public defender immunity ensures that
the resources available to serve the indigent constituency will be
used for the defense of the accused, rather than diminished
through the defense of public defenders against civil suits for
malpractice. 3 4 The court reasoned that immunity will conserve
these resources to provide "an effective defense to the greatest
number of indigent defendants" 135 and aid in the continued re-
cruitment of qualified attorneys to serve as public defenders.' 36
Finally, when it considered the interests of the indigent de-
fendant who believes he or she was inadequately represented,
the court stressed that the indigent defendant may seek collat-
eral remedies through the appeals process, motions for post-con-
130. Id. at 775. Privately retained counsel may reject a client based upon
such factors as the merits of the case, the personality of the client, and the
counsel's workload. Id.
131. Id. at 776. The court stated that "[the] funds available to the client
usually serve to prevent the presentation of frivolous claims, tactics or defenses.
There is no similar 'brake' in the public-defender-client relationship since the
state, rather than the client, pays the attorney." Id.
132. Id. at 775. The court relied on an earlier decision which granted immu-
nity to guardians ad litem for actions performed within the scope of their duty.
Id.; see also Tindell v. Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386; 387 (Minn. 1988) ("Immu-
nity is necessary to avoid harassment from disgruntled parents who may take
issue with any or all of the guardian's actions.").
133. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776-77. The court reasoned that "[i]mmunity
exists to free government officials from the burdensome consequences of litiga-
tion." Id. at 776.
134. Id. at 776-78.
135. Id. at 778. Dziubak, however, is the only suit since the establishment
of the public defender office in 1965 to survive summary judgement that this
author could locate.
136. Id. at 777.
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viction relief, and federal habeas corpus petitions.1 3 7 The court,
however, mentioned no viable avenue through which a dissatis-
fied indigent defendant could collect a monetary remedy.
Justice Gardebring dissented from the majority decision in
Dziubak.138 She argued that public defenders should not be im-
mune from legal malpractice because immunity would result in
a two-tier system of justice in which clients with enough money
to retain a lawyer possess a powerful remunerative accountabil-
ity measure against their lawyers, while those too poor to pay
for representation do not possess such a weapon.13 9 Justice
Gardebring also argued that immunity does not promote suffi-
cient public policy goals to warrant the extension of immunity to
public defenders. 140 She contended further that absolute public
defender immunity sanctions the chronic underfunding of the
public defender system in Minnesota by easing the obligations
that public defenders owe to their clients. 141
III. DZIUBAK'S IMPACT ON BOTH CLIENTS AND
LAWYERS NECESSITATES A SOLUTION THAT
BETTER BALANCES THE INTERESTS
OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS
Difficult social and political considerations complicate any
critique of the delivery and adequacy of indigent criminal repre-
sentation. 142 The indigent defense system, caught between con-
stitutional standards of fair process and substantive rights and
popular sentiments of law and order, must ensure that all inter-
ests are taken into consideration.
A. .DZzUBAK FAILS TO BALANCE ADEQUATELY THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AND THE NEEDS OF PUBLIC
DEFENDERS
The Dziubak court failed to balance the interests of indigent
criminal defendants, the needs of public defenders, and the
socio-political realities of state-sponsored indigent legal repre-
137. Id.; see also supra part I.D (discussing forms of relief available to indi-
gent criminal defendants who are unhappy with their counsel).
138. See Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778-79 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 778.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing political
considerations).
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sentation. The court missed the opportunity to force the legisla-
ture to confront the crisis of "out of bounds" caseloads and
overworked lawyers in the indigent defense system that the
court has recognized exists in Minnesota. 43 As a result, the
court allowed immediate political circumstances to constrain its
analysis.
By declaring that public defenders are immune from mal-
practice, the Minnesota Supreme Court simply bandaged the
problem of overburdened defenders and suspect representation
of indigent accused, instead of providing a remedy. The court
concentrated on relieving the public defender of responsibility
for inadequate representation instead of focusing either on the
crisis confronting Minnesota defender offices or on indigent cli-
ents, who, facing a loss of freedom, may seek a remunerative
remedy for insufficient representation.144
In so doing, the Dziubak court failed to consider the func-
tional analysis that other state supreme courts have applied,
which have more comprehensively balanced the needs of public
defenders 145 and indigent defendants. -4r For instance, in Reese
143. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775-76.
144. The dissenting Justice in Dziubak did focus on this problem, however:
[T]he real disadvantage is, of course, to the indigent defendant, whom
we have said has no right to choose his lawyer, but must depend on
whomever is assigned in matters that are of the most extreme gravity.
If the public defender fails in the task of representation, he or she may
be subject to an unfavorable performance appraisal; but the client may
be unfairly convicted of a crime and sentenced to prison. The presence
of remedies to overturn the conviction due to ineffectiveness of counsel
cannot fully 'right the wrong' done to someone who may have spent
extended periods of time incarcerated unjustly. I believe a civil remedy
is needed.
Id. at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
145. One commentator noted that "[inadequate funding has created a situa-
tion wherein overburdened defense counsel cannot possibly provide competent
representation to all of the clients they are assigned to represent." Klein, Elev-
enth Commandment, supra note 1, at 432.
146. In her dissent, Justice Gardebring further criticized the majority
opinion:
While the majority considers it an unfair burden to subject the public
defender to malpractice stemming from acts or omissions due to impos-
sible caseloads and an under-funded office, factors out of the control of
the defender, it is even more unfair that the indigent client should suf-
fer from misrepresentation due to under-funded offices. I do not be-
lieve this court should sanction the chronic underfunding of public
defense organizations by lessening the obligations which public de-
fenders have to their indigent clients.
Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
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v. Danforth,'47 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
place the potential liability of court-appointed counsel over the
interests of the indigent client and reasoned that the same stan-
dards of professional performance applied both to public and pri-
vate counsel. 148 The Reese court reasoned that absolute
immunity would impermissibly distinguish between groups of
plaintiffs based on economic status in a manner inconsistent
with the ideal that the quality of defense counsel should not turn
on the source of compensation. 149 Similarly, in Spring v. Con-
stantino,150 the Connecticut Supreme Court focused on the cen-
trality of the attorney-client relationship and the deleterious
impact of immunity on this relationship.' 5 ' In refusing to ex-
tend immunity to public defenders, the Spring court reasoned
that once a court assigns a public defender to a case, his or her
relationship and obligations to the client are the same as those
of a privately-retained counsel.' 52
Even when other state courts extended some form of liabil-
ity protection to public defenders, they declined to do so by
blanketing court-appointed counsel with absolute judicial immu-
nity. In Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 53 for example, a New
York intermediate court extended only qualified immunity to
court-appointed counsel, allowing indigent defendants to sue
public defenders for ministerial or clerical errors.'5 4 Similarly,
in Browne v. Robb,15 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
liability protection for public defenders did not cover grossly
negligent errors or acts or omissions made in bad faith. 156
In addition, the Dziubak court failed to analyze liability
under the Minnesota state tort claims act.' 57 In so doing, it ig-
nored that the majority of other states' courts have interpreted
147. 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text
(discussing Reese).
148. 406 A.2d at 740.
149. Id.
150. 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975); see also supra note 91 and accompanying
text (discussing Spring).
151. 362 A.2d at 878-79.
152. Id. at 878.
153. 407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1978); see also supra note 95 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Scott).
154. 407 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
155. 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991); see also note
94 and accompanying text (discussing the application of state tort claims acts to
public defenders).
156. 583 A.2d at 952.
157. MINN. STAT. § 3.736; see also supra part I.E (describing state employee
liability under Minnesota state tort claims act).
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liability under their state tort claims acts. 158 Thus, the Dziubak
decision provides no guidance on matters of government em-
ployee liability that might affect other public defender person-
nel, such as law clerks and secretaries, legal aid lawyers,
privately-contracted public defense attorneys, and public de-
fender investigators.
As a result, the Dziubak court has created a two-tier crimi-
nal justice system159 that abrogates the spirit of Gideon.160 Peo-
ple who have the money to retain their own attorney, whether in
a criminal or civil action, may sue the attorney for negligence.
In contrast, the Dziubak decision denies only poor people the
ability to hold their criminal defense lawyers monetarily ac-
countable for unsatisfactory representation. 161 Moreover, the
decision failed to articulate any suggestions for improving either
the work conditions of public defenders or the quality of repre-
sentation available to indigent clients. 162
The Dziubak court also reasoned that liability would impede
the exercise of a public defender's judgment in representing his
or her clients and ultimately hurt the people the attorney is try-
ing to help.' 63 The court's assertion, however, has not proven
158. See supra part I.D.4 (describing other states' treatment of public de-
fender liability).
159. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
160. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
161. One commentator explained the situation indigent defendants face:
Poor clients become doubly disadvantaged: they may neither choose
their lawyer nor recover damages if the appointed attorney is negli-
gent. Far from improving the quality of indigent representation, im-
munity for appointed counsel will reduce the quality of representation
available to the poor. Paid less than private attorneys and insulated
from malpractice liability, court-appointed counsel will almost cer-
tainly render less effective representation.
David H. Potel, Comment, Criminal Malpractice: Threshold Barriers to Recov-
ery Against Negligent Criminal Counsel, 1981 DuxE L.J. 542, 560.
162. See Goodpaster, supra note 71, at 64-67 (noting the need to consider
systemic problems for ineffective assistance of counsel evaluations under
Strickland); see also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1378-84 (Ariz. 1984) (advo-
cating wholesale revamping of indigent defense system because of threat of in-
effective assistance due to high caseloads).
163. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 777 (quoting Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046,
1048-49 (3d Cir. 1972)). A criminal defendant could bring suit against a public
defender in three possible situations. The lawyer's negligence or inadequate
representation may cause the erroneous conviction of an innocent person. The
lawyer's failure to adequately conduct the case could cause the wrongful convic-
tion of a guilty person. Lastly, a guilty person who is rightly convicted might
nonetheless bring a suit against an attorney who had acted reasonably when
conducting the case. Because the court in Dziubak was only considering the
issue of immunity without the negligence claims, it concentrated on the third
scenario, to the virtual exclusion of either of the first two scenarios.
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true in Minnesota during the thirty years public defenders oper-
ated without the shield of immunity.164 In Hennepin County,
for example, few unsatisfied clients have brought legal malprac-
tice suits against public defenders. 165 Furthermore, courts have
summarily dismissed the few cases that unsatisfied clients did
bring.166
The Dziubak court further insisted that immunity promotes
professionalism.' 67 Commentators and public defenders have
roundly and justifiably criticized this argument. 16  Both groups
contend that the threat of malpractice liability keeps public de-
fenders sharp. 169 Furthermore, the court ignored the possibility
that public defenders need no external impetus to perform pro-
fessionally, that they might do so out of personal integrity or
concern for the client community they serve. Immunity implic-
itly sends the message that public defenders are not meeting
these minimum standards and therefore need protection. If
public defenders are rendering effective assistance of counsel
and abiding by rules of professional responsibility,170 however,
164. See supra note 142 (noting the lack of suits against public defenders).
165. The few legal malpractice suits brought prior to Dziubak against Hen-
nepin County public defenders consumed very few hours of court time and the
courts regularly dismissed these suits. Interview with William R. Kennedy,
Chief Public Defender of Hennepin County, in Minneapolis, MN (November 17,
1993).
166. Id.
167. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776-77; see Mallen, supra note 62, at 68-70.
168. As one commentator explained:
The problem of professional discretion is faced by all attorneys, how-
ever, not merely by appointed counsel. Retained and court-appointed
attorneys perform identical duties. Each requires freedom to exercise
professional discretion, and appointed counsel merit no special
treatment.
Potel, supra note 161, at 558.
169. See Mallen, supra note 62, at 68-70.
170. Dicta in Dziubak, however, regarding the obligations of public defend-
ers suggests that public defenders will encounter greater difficulty in complying
with these rules. The Dziubak court supported its holding by stating that pub-
lic defenders have an obligation to accept all cases to which they are appointed,
regardless of the attorney's caseload or degree of difficulty the case presents.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text. The court implied that, unlike pri-
vately-retained counsel, nothing prevents public defenders who might press
frivolous claims in criminal court at the whim of their indigent clients in order
to avoid malpractice suits. Id. at 775-76. The Dziubak court did not cite any
cases to support its point that public defenders bring frivolous claims at the
behest of their clients, unlike privately-retained lawyers.
This dicta appears to be the first time the court has expressly obligated
public defenders to take all cases. Such an obligation creates compliance
problems with the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, a
chief public defender of a "grossly under-funded" office must now require attor-
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they do not need absolute protection from malpractice liability.
Immunity conveys to the indigent client the message that his or
her lawyer is incompetent and therefore requires absolute liabil-
ity protection.
Dziubak erroneously implies that courts would too easily
find attorneys in underfunded and understaffed public defender
offices civilly liable unless absolute immunity protected the at-
torneys.'7 1 The Dziubak court's holding ignored the great diffi-
culty a dissatisfied client already faces when bringing a
malpractice suit against public defender.17 2 Malpractice suits,
although burdensome, provide a check on the indigent criminal
representation system. These suits evaluate the lawyer's per-
formance and assess the quality and sufficiency of the advocate's
services. Furthermore, the Dziubak decision ignores the practi-
cal constraints that Minnesota law imposes on legal malpractice
actions. Traditionally, courts have awarded only low sums for
neys in his or her office to take all cases, regardless of attorney caseload and the
case's degree of difficulty, even though in so doing they may violate ethical and
professional obligations. The rules of professional conduct require that the law-
yer devote a certain amount of time and energy to the investigation and prepa-
ration of each client. See MINNESOTA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT R. 1.1-
.3. Considering 3,700 cases each year in Hennepin County are serious felonies,
it is difficult to believe that each client receives the attention due them under
the Rules. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.16 commen-
tary ("A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be
performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to
completion."). Bringing a frivolous claim directly violates a lawyer's ethical and
professional responsibility. See MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT
R. 3.1.
This situation raises the question of whether the public defender offices in
Ramsey and Hennepin County, and other offices with similar caseloads, should
be exempt from the professional and ethical standards binding the other law-
yers in the state. Conceivably, especially in large urban districts, if public de-
fenders cannot refuse a large number of cases, "out of bounds" caseloads will
result in some unethically ineffective assistance.
171. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776. Exposing public defenders to malpractice
suits in state tort actions will not necessarily cause an explosion in the civil
legal malpractice docket. None of the parties in Dziubak provided any empiri-
cal data to support the conclusion that the risk of malpractice litigation deters
members of the private bar from accepting the representation of indigent de-
fendants or adversely affects the quality of representation. Dziubak, 503
N.W.2d at 778 (Gardebring, J., dissenting); see Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,
200 n.17 (1979).
172. The Dziubak court admitted as much when it stated:
It is doubtful that an indigent client could prevail against a public de-
fender in a negligence suit for failing to pursue a particular strategy,
and if a negligence claim involves a dispute over a choice of strategies,
it should fail, since honest errors may be made which do not raise to
the level of malpractice.
Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776.
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criminal legal malpractice actions.' 7 3 Additionally, the Minne-
sota state tort claims act limits the awards for tort actions
against state employees. 174
The Dziubak court further asserted that civil liability would
impede the recruitment and retention of able and qualified pub-
lic defenders.' 75 Although courts have found this reasoning per-
suasive in the past when addressing public defender
liabilities,' 7 6 it fails to prove that this fear is legitimate in the
current competitive legal market in Minnesota and the na-
tion.'7 7 As a result, the court has also misperceived the motiva-
tions of those attorneys joining the ranks of public defender
offices in Minnesota. Attorney pay probably acts as the greatest
deterrent to recruiting qualified lawyers to work as public de-
fenders, not the threat of malpractice liability.
B. Two-PRONGED SOLUTION: A MODIFED THRESHOLD FOR
PROVING INEFFECTIVE AsSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND
LIMITED STATUTORY LIABILITY
The Sixth Amendment requires the effective assistance of
counsel.' 7 8 Strickland v. Washington 79 established a minimum
standard by which state courts are to determine whether assist-
ance of counsel is ineffective under the federal constitution. In
Ferri v. Ackerman,'8 0 the Supreme Court further held that the
decision to extend immunity to state defenders for malpractice is
173. See supra note 81 (citing relatively minimal damage awards for mal-
practice actions against criminal defense counsel). The Dziubak court did not
find this point persuasive. 503 N.W.2d at 776.
174. See MIN. STAT. § 3.736, subds. 3, 4; see supra Part I.E.
175. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 776.
176. See, e.g., Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 409 (7th Cir. 1978),
overruled by Polk County v. Dobson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981); Miller v. Barilla,
549 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating "two major considerations-encour-
agement of free exercise of discretion and recruitment of persons for public de-
fender positions" support the need for immunity), overruled by Glover v. Tower,
700 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1983); Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir.
1976) (stating "the need to recruit and hold able lawyers to represent indigents"
supports a rule of absolute immunity).
177. According to Justice Gardebring, "immunity is not necessary to pre-
serve the ability to recruit and maintain dedicated professionals willing to serve
as public defenders. There is no shortage of private attorneys willing to do
criminal defense work without immunity." Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 778.
178. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); see also supra
note 19 (quoting the Sixth Amendment).
179. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
180. 444 U.S. 193 (1979).
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an issue of state concern.' 8 ' Thus, a state court's decision to
protect public defenders from malpractice liability should not
hinder the state from comporting with its constitutional obliga-
tions to provide adequate representation to indigent defendants.
As a result, determining the propriety of public defender immu-
nity from legal malpractice demands evaluating the adequacy of
the indigent criminal defense system.
A two-pronged solution, including a threshold for proving
ineffective assistance adapted to the public defense context and
limited statutory liability, ensures more effective assistance of
counsel than the decision in Dziubak. Furthermore, this solu-
tion would allow public defenders the independence necessary to
zealously represent their clients and enable the legislature to
bestow rights on accused or imprisoned indigent defendants in
the current political climate.
1. Modifying the Threshold for Proving Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel
The Minnesota Supreme Court should contextualize Strick-
land by modifying the evidentiary threshold for proving ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims against public defenders.
Presently, Minnesota courts employ the two-prong Strickland
test at the same minimal level which the Supreme Court estab-
lished.' 8 2 The court should adapt Strickland's subjective "inef-
fectiveness" prong to the public defender context by removing
Strickland's "presumption of effectiveness" from cases involving
public defenders and court-appointed counsel in Minnesota serv-
ing in districts in which an attorney's caseload of indigent crimi-
nal defendants exceeds acceptable limits. 8 3 The threshold for
proving ineffective assistance under these circumstances should
181. Id. at 198; see also supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Ferri's holding).
182. To gain a new trial on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate that the conduct or errors of counsel were unrea-
sonable and that those errors constitutionally prejudiced her, a standard predi-
cated on a stringent reading of Strickland. See State v. Gassler, 505 N.W.2d 62,
70 (Minn. 1993); Dunn v. State, 499 N.W.2d 37, 38 (Minn. 1993); State v. Eling,
355 N.W.2d 286, 293 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Rainer, 502 N.W.2d 784,
788 (Minn. 1993) (stating that appellate courts will not review defense counsel
trial tactics).
183. Goodpaster, supra note 71, at 72-78 (criticizing Strickland's presump-
tion of effectiveness).
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reflect the current crisis in Minnesota's indigent defense deliv-
ery system.'84
Although Strickland established a minimum threshold to
assess ineffective assistance of counsel challenges in criminal
cases, 185 it allows courts to modify either part of the two-prong
test. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Peart,'8 6
contextualized Strickland in just such a manner.' 8 7 The court
determined that the public-defense counsel system in New Orle-
ans criminal court was so overburdened with cases that it cre-
ated a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel anytime a
public defender was appointed.' 88 The court reasoned that it
was important to address ineffectiveness claims at as early a
stage in the proceedings as possible 8 9 and that the eventual
verdict of the case did not matter.'90 The court clarified that it
defined "reasonably effective assistance of counsel" to mean that
the lawyer not only possesses adequate skill and knowledge, but
also that he or she has the time and resources to apply his or her
skill and knowledge to the task of defending each of his or her
individual clients.19'
184. See supra Part .C (discussing the crisis in the Minnesota indigent de-
fense delivery system).
185. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Strickland and ineffective assistance
of counsel). One commentator suggested Strickland was "obviously intended to
establish a general standard" for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Good-
paster, supra note 71, at 61 (emphasis added). Modifying the Strickland stan-
dard in Minnesota would ameliorate the problem of unequal representation for
indigent defendants, a problem which Justice Marshall accurately predicted in
his Strickland dissent. See supra note 40 (discussing Marshall's dissent in
Strickland). Justice Marshall stated that his "objection to the performance
standard adopted by the [Strickland] Court is that it is so malleable that in
practice, it will either have no grip at all or will yield excessive variation in the
manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted and applied." 466 U.S. at
707 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
186. 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
187. Id. at 788.
188. Id. (establishing rebuttable presumption of ineffective counsel for pub-
lic defenders appointed in New Orleans criminal court); see infra note 71 and
accompanying text (discussing the Peart decision).
189. 621 So.2d at 787. While the Peart court adhered to the Strickland ad-
monition that ineffectiveness claims be handled on a case-by-case basis, it coun-
seled that the analysis must make a broader inquiry into the system of defense
delivery affecting the performance of the public defender or court-appointed
counsel. Id. at 788.
190. Id. at 787.
191. Id. at 789. The Peart court indicated that if the legislature did not re-
spond to the crisis in indigent defense in New Orleans, the court would adopt
more intrusive measures to ensure compliance with the constitutional guaran-
tee of effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 791.
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Importantly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated
that, under the Minnesota Constitution, it may look favorably
on interpreting a constitutional right192 as providing greater
protection than that granted by federal courts under the federal
constitution.393 Contextualizing the threshold for sustaining in-
effective assistance of counsel claims by modifying the first
prong of the Strickland test would enable the courts to hear
more meritorious cases and provide justice to indigents. 94 A
higher standard would also promote attorney professionalism,
minimize liability, and bring the issues of the quality of public
defender representation and caseload burdens into the Minne-
sota courts.
2. Limited Statutory Liability
Modifying the threshold for proving ineffective assistance of
counsel in Minnesota provides indigent criminal defendants
with an efficacious collateral attack against incompetent defense
lawyers. It does not, however, obviate the state's obligation to
provide dissatisfied criminal indigent defendants with a mean-
ingful avenue of monetary redress for incompetent counsel.
Therefore, the Minnesota legislature should expressly extend
limited statutory liability to public defenders as state
employees. 195
Although the Dziubak court did not violate any separation
of powers tenets by bestowing absolute immunity upon public
defenders,' 96 it neglected even to consider the saliency of the
state employee tort claims statute to the issue of public defender
liability. It thus failed to recognize the broad protection already
in place for public defenders as state employees. As a result, it
erroneously deprived indigent litigants of an existing remedial
192. See supra note 19 (quoting the Sixth Amendment of the Minnesota
Constitution).
193. The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "[i]t is altogether fitting
that our constitution be interpreted by this state's highest court to offer greater
safeguards of fundamental rights for Minnesota citizens than the protection of-
fered citizens of the United States under the federal Constitution." Friedman v.
Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Minn. 1991) (emphasis ad-
ded); see also supra note 19 (noting that state courts may broadly interpret the
rights which their state constitutions provide).
194. Allowing for ineffective assistance hearings earlier in the criminal pro-
cess would also achieve this goal.
195. In the alternative, the Minnesota Supreme Court could assess public
defender liability under MINN. STAT. § 3.736 if a plaintiff initiated a suit
squarely predicated on the state tort claims act.
196. See MwNN. STAT. § 3.736 ("[N]othing in this section waives the defense
of judicial or legislative immunity.").
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mechanism under which the courts might examine specific acts
of public defenders.
Assessing public defender liability under the state tort
claims act better considers both the interests of lawyers and cli-
ents. Adhering to the liability parameters of the tort claims
statute limits the scope of Dziubak without entirely destroying
it. Determining liability is a task well-suited to the legislature
because of its ability to hold hearings, gather empirical data,
and decide the issue in an open and public forum. 197 A system of
limited liability for public defenders under the tort claims stat-
ute preserves the core of Dziubak while allowing indigent de-
fendants to sue for gross negligence, ministerial errors, or
negligent acts made in bad faith.198
A proceeding under the Minnesota state tort claims act in-
volves a case-by-case determination of the actual act, an analy-
sis of the good faith or reasonableness employed by the attorney
at suit, and acts or omissions made as a result of insufficient
resources. The analysis focuses on the acts rather than the ac-
tor.199 In this context, the threat of legal malpractice suits can
promote professionalism and create a record for evaluating the
performance of the indigent defense delivery system.
Furthermore, limited statutory liability will not open a
floodgate of successful malpractice actions. Indigent defendants
who bring legal malpractice suits have difficulty prevailing be-
cause of the lack of resources available to the indigent, the incar-
cerated position of many potential litigants, and the reality that
members of the bar are still reluctant to participate in actions
197. See Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979). As one commenta-
tor noted:
Finally, even if the proponents of immunity are correct, the question is
better suited to legislative rather than judicial determination. A state
legislature may decide that public policy demands such immunity for
appointed counsel, and confer it by statute. In the absence of legisla-
tive action, however, the judiciary should not extend immunity to
court-appointed attorneys.
Potel, supra note 161, at 560.
198. In Delaware, for example, the state's highest court allowed liability for
public defenders acting in bad faith or with gross negligence in carrying out
their duties as advocates. See Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991).
199. In this respect, limited statutory liability functions similarly to quali-
fied immunity. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Erickson v.
County of Clay, 451 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding prosecutorial
immunity depends on the functional nature of activities rather than on the sta-
tus of the prosecutor); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 400 N.W.2d 350 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (applying Harlow objective test to actor's conduct to determine
immunity).
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against colleagues alleging lawyer misconduct.200 Limiting the
scope of "immunity" serves the interests of indigent clients while
maintaining some protection for the public defenders who repre-
sent them.201
CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's controversial holding in
Dziubak reopens a debate, largely dormant in both the courts
and the academic community, over the viability and propriety of
immunity for public defenders from legal malpractice action. In-
digent criminal defendants in Minnesota have few means at
their disposal to effectively address, either by collateral attack
on their conviction or by seeking money damages, incompetent
counsel. Combining a modified threshold on ineffective assist-
ance of counsel claims with limited statutory liability provides
greater constitutional protection for indigent clients, establishes
a limited, but efficacious remunerative measure for dissatisfied
defendants, and effectively strikes a balance between the profes-
sional needs of the lawyers, the constitutional needs of the indi-
gents, and the budgetary constraints of the courts and the state.
This solution might make the job of being a public defender
more difficult. The solution, however, allows an indigent de-
fendant to bring into court more often the issue of caseload level
and effective assistance as a defense and ensures an analysis of
the particular circumstances of public defender practice. The so-
lution would require courts to focus on the actual crisis in the
200. See, e.g., Mallen, supra note 62, at 68-69.
201. Public defenders are, ironically, not likely to be the most vociferous pro-
ponents of immunity. One commentator explained why public defenders might
oppose absolute immunity:
Although immunity does appeal to a lawyer faced with the reality of a
substantial claim for damages, philosophically the defense is repug-
nant to most court-appointed lawyers. Public defenders and court-ap-
pointed lawyers do not believe that the source of either their
compensation [or] their clientele affects the quality and extent of their
services or ethical responsibilities. Since the most serious danger in-
volved in a malpractice claim is financial, as long as that exposure can
be protected by insurance or indemnity, immunity is not only unneces-
sary but also undesired.
Id. at 70.
One can find support for this belief in Minnesota, where both the State
Public Defender, John Stuart, and the Fourth Judicial District Chief Public De-
fender, William Kennedy, opposed immunity. See Zack, supra note 48. Accord-
ing to Kennedy, "Dziubak is the worst Minnesota decision I have read in my
thirty-two years as a lawyer." Interview with William R. Kennedy, supra note
165. The Chief Public Defender of Ramsey County and the defendant in Dzi-
ubak, J. Thomas Hankes, does not appear, however, to oppose immunity.
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delivery system and rule on whether the representation the sys-
tem provides for indigents meets the guarantee indigents are af-
forded under the Constitution.

